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Default de se: The Interpretation of the Ewe logophor1
Abigail Anne Bimpeh - Goethe University, Frankfurt
Abstract. This paper aims at evaluating two contradicting generalizations regarding the inter-
pretation of logophoric pronouns, using data from Ewedomegbe (the Northern Ghanaian dialect
of Ewe). Clements (1975), for instance, and many others propose that the default interpretation of
the Ewe logophoric pronoun ye` is unambiguously attitude de se like PRO in English, see Chierchia
(1989). This view is challenged by Pearson (2015), who presents data that shows that ye` may be
read de re as well. I presented real-world examples of ‘mistaken’ identity to ten native informants,
as well as examples of dream reports to two native informants. Regarding ‘mistaken identity’, the
judgments confirm the standard view by Clements (1975) and others that the logophoric pronoun
ye` seems unambiguously attitude de se. For dream reports, the judgments show that they may not
be useful in shedding light on the de re, de se distinction. I discuss possible explanations for the
different judgments.
1 Introduction
Logophoric pronouns are pronouns used in indirect discourse to report the thoughts, feelings, emo-
tions or attitudes of an individual (Clements 1975). As observed by Sells (1987), logophoric pro-
nouns appear within sentential arguments of predicates of communication and mental experience.
The canonical use of the logophoric pronoun is to distinguish the attitude holder (the one whose
thoughts are being communicated) from all others. This means that in English, when Mawuse
utters (1a), a report in the form of (1b) or (1c) is expected.
(1) a. Mawuse said “I am hungry”. Direct discourse
b. Mawuse said she is hungry. Indirect discourse
c. Mawuse claimed PRO to be hungry. Infinitive construction
Although (1b) effectively communicates Mawuse’s speech in (1a), it is ambiguous. The am-
biguity of (1b) stems from the use of the pronoun she. Inasmuch as she refers to Mawuse, she
could also refer to some other person who hasn’t been mentioned in the discourse. Consequently,
to disambiguate (1b), PRO, the null pronominal element which acts as the subject of infinitives
and gerunds (Chierchia 1989; Schlenker 1999) is used. PRO is used because when embedded un-
1I am grateful to many people for discussions on earlier versions of this material. Firstly, I would like to thank
the organisers and audience of TripleA 5 especially, Alassane Kiemtore´, Jozina Vander Klok, Mary Amaechi and
Rajesh Bhatt for their useful comments. I am also grateful to my informants for their patience, time and cooperation.
Many thanks to Amy Rose Deal for being an inspiration. I gratefully acknowledge comments from Ce´cile Meier,
Chris Collins, Daniel Hole, Ede T. Zimmermann, Esther Rinke, Felix Ameka and audience of CALL 2018, Frank
Sode, Hazel Pearson, Heidi Klockmann, Idan Landau, Katharina Hartmann, Malte Zimmermann, Martin Everaert,
Petra Schulz, Philippe Schlenker, Selikem Gotah, Winnie Lechner, Zheng Shen; and my colleagues: Astrid, Caro, Eu,
Fenna, Lai, Lydia, Melly, Priscilla, Ruby, Sam, Sanja, Yranahan.
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der an attitude verb, it is always understood to report a first person’s (or second person’s) thought
(Schlenker 2011). Thus, (1c) does this successfully.
The notion of logophoricity was pioneered by Hage`ge (1974) who observed that unlike in
English, in many African languages including Ewe (Clements 1975), there is a dedicated overt
pronoun, different from the third person pronoun, to show logophoricity. The first part of this pa-
per is concerned with the state of the art regarding logophoricity in Ewe, the notion of de re and de
se, and two contrasting views regarding its interpretation. The rest of the paper addresses the prob-
lem arising from the contrasting views and outlines some explanations for the varying judgments.
2 Logophoricity in Ewe, De re and De se Attitude Reports
This section involves logophoricity in Ewe and briefly describes the concept of de se and de re in
relation to logophoricty.
2.1 Logophoricity in Ewe
The logophoric pronoun in Ewe is ye`2. It is used exclusively in indirect discourse in Ewe, and
is replaced in direct discourse by the appropriate first person singular pronoun (Clements 1975).
Thus, ye` is restricted to the environment of attitude predicates such as think, say, believe, among
others. Should reference be made to any person other than the attitude holder, the third person
singular pronoun is used. Notably, Ewe presents a case of obviation (i.e disjoint in reference)3. In
the scope of attitude predicates, the third person pronoun e´ does not denote the attitude holder. The
data4 below replicates Clements (1975)’s findings on logophoricity in Ewe. Consider (2).
(2) a. Mawuse
Mawuse
gblO
said
be
COMP
“dO
stomach
le
is
nye
1SG
wu`-m”.
kill-PROG
Direct discourse
‘Mawuse said: “I am hungry”.’
b. Mawuse
Mawuse
gblO
said
be
COMP
dO
stomach
le
is
ye`
LOG
wu`-m.
kill-PROG
Indirect discourse
‘Mawusei said shei/⇤j is hungry.’
c. Mawuse
Mawuse
gblO
said
be
COMP
dO
stomach
le
is
e´
3SG
wu`-m.
kill-PROG
Indirect discourse: obviation
‘Mawusei said shej/⇤i is hungry.’
The logophoric pronoun ye` also has a plural counterpart ye`-wo´ which is used to report the
thoughts and perceptions of plural attitude holders, as in (3). Note that, obviation pretains here as
well (see (3-b)). ye`-wo´ differs from the regular third person plural pronoun wo´ and again, in the
scope of an attitude predicate wo´ does not refer to the subject of an attitude.
2I elicited yı`, a variant of ye` from my Peki informants.
3I thank Rajesh Bhatt for discussions on the subject.
4Some speakers prefer to use the order wu` nye in (2a). I thank Chris Collins for notifying me.
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(3) a. Eli
Eli
kple
CONJ
Mansa
Mansa
xOese
believe
be
COMP
ye`-wo´
LOG-PL
dze-agbagba.
do-well
‘Eli and Mansai believed that theyi did well.’
b. Eli
Eli
kple
CONJ
Mansa
Mansa
xOese
believe
be
COMP
wo´
3PL
dze-agbagba.
do-well
Eli and Mansai believed that theyj did well.’
In Ewe, there are cases where two attitude predicates can interract. As observed by Agbedor
(2014), in such instances, coreference is between two possible antecedents, Adzo´a and Ama in (4).
(4) Adzo´a
Adzo´a
su´su´
think
be
COMP
Ama
Ama
gblO
say
be
COMP
ye`
LOG
lO
love
Kofi.
Kofi
‘Adzo´ai thinks that Amaj said that shei/j loves Kofi’ (Agbedor 2014, p. 58 e.x. 17).
Remarkably, the complementizer be is a ‘logophoric licensor’5 in that it always introduces an
attitude which may be reported. As is the case cross-linguistically, the complementizer be seems to
have developed historically from the verb be ‘say’6. Consequently, irrespective of the attitude verb,
a report without be renders the said report ungrammatical, as shown in (5a). In the case where the
attitude verb is gblO, also ‘say’, the attitude is marked twice. Consider example (2) again. It is also
possible to exclude gblO from (2) since gblO may be optional in Ewe. In such instances, as shown
in (5b), be is assumed to serve as both the verb and complementizer.
(5) a. *Mawuse
Mawuse
gblO/xOese/su´su´
said/believe/think
dO
stomach
le
is
ye`
LOG
wu`-m.
kill-PROG
‘Mawusei said/believe/think shei is hungry.’
[intended: Mawuse said/believed/thought that she is hungry]
b. Mawuse
Mawuse
be
said
dO
stomach
le
is
ye`
LOG
wu`-m.
kill-PROG
‘Mawusei said shei/⇤j is hungry.’
2.2 The Philosophical View of De re and De se
De re and de se are Latin words which mean ‘of the thing itself’ and ‘of oneself’ respectively
(McKay and Nelson 2014). These terms are used in intensional semantics to make referential and
attitudinal distinction. Following D. Lewis (1979, pp. 521-539), ascription of properties to indi-
viduals is known as attitude de re, whereas self-ascription of properties is termed attitude de se,
also known as ‘self-ascription’ or ‘reference de se’. I illustrate this distinction with a well-known
example from Kaplan (1989, p. 533).
5The term is used by Agbedor (2014).
6Examples: kO, ka´, ku-ti and ke are complementizers derrived from the verb say in Gokana, Igbo, Chewa and Efik
respectively (c.f. Dimmendaal 2001, p. 143)
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(6) S1 (de se): Kaplan believes: “my pants are on fire.”
S2 (de re): Kaplan sees himself in a reflecting glass, unaware that he is watching himself.
He ascribes to himself, under the description “the one I am watching”, the property of
wearing pants that are on fire .
a. Kaplan believes that his pants are on fire. [ S1, S2]
b. Kaplan believes of himself that his pants are on fire. [ S1, #S2]
In S1, Kaplan holds a de se belief about himself. This means that he sees that his pants are on
fire and he is aware of this fact. By contrast, in S2, Kaplan has a belief about a certain res i.e the
one whose pants are on fire, although himself. His mental state is not of someone who says “my
pants are on fire”. This is known as the de re reading. As such, (6-a) can be used to describe both
S1 and S2 but (6-b) can only be used to describe S1.
Having described briefly logophoricity, PRO and the philosophical view of de se and de re atti-
tudes, a close link can be observed between the logophoric pronoun, PRO and attitude de se. First,
according to (Morgan 1970; Sells 1987, among others), logophoric pronouns behave semantically
like PRO. The analogy, therefore, is that since it holds true that both PRO and logophoric pronouns
can only be used to report an “I”-attitude, they must have an “I”-reading (de se). I move on to
discuss the two views concerning this claim.
3 The Standard vs. The Competing View
In determining the interpretation of logophoric pronouns, contexts are known to play an essential
role. As a result, scholars have generated scenarios such as (6) to tease apart different readings of
logophors. We can summarise the issue at hand in table 1.
Table 1.
coreference de se coreference de re dis-joint reference
ye` ? ye` e´
Do logophoric pronouns like ye` permit de re readings? Two generalisations can be found in the
literature concerning the interpretation of the Ewe logophor. I classify them as “the standard” and
“the competing” view. I use the term “the standard” in the sense that it is the widely-held view,
and “the competing”, on the grounds that it stems from more current research that challenges the
widely-held view.
“The standard” view generally assigns a de se interpretation to logophoric pronouns, i.e when
the speech is reported from the first person’s perspective (see Sells 1987; Chierchia 1989, etc). In
“the competing” view, however, ‘pure’ Ewe and Mina are used as a case study to show that a de re
interpretation may be expressed (see Pearson 2012; Pearson 2015). In this section, I present both
views with respect to ‘mistaken’ identity scenarios (3.1) and dream reports (3.2).
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3.1 Mistaken Identity Scenarios
The standard take on logophoric pronouns is that they are de se elements (see Chierchia 1989;
Schlenker 1999; Anand 2006, etc). To refer to an attitude holder in reported speech, a logophoric
pronoun or PRO (for English) is used. As Clements (1975) rightly puts it, the logophoric pronoun
unambiguously establishes the correct assignment of co-reference. One of the problems, however,
arises in the so-called ‘mistaken’ identity contexts, where the attitude holder seems to be in an ‘un-
conscious’ state such that he or she does not have knowledge of being the referent of the reported
speech act. Consider (6) and (7).
(7) John is so drunk that he has forgotten he is a candidate in the election. He watches someone
on TV and finds that that person is a terrific candidate, who should definitely be elected.
Unbeknownst to John, the candidate he is watching on TV is John himself (Schlenker 2011,
p. 12).
a. John hopes that he will be elected. true
b. John hopes PRO to be elected (in real-life, John does not want to win). false
(8) John has just found an old paper that he wrote, but he doesn’t realize that he is the author
of the paper. He reads it and is impressed by what a good paper it is. He says, “whoever
wrote this paper is clever” (Pearson 2015, p. 79).
a. John said that he is clever. true
b. John claimed PRO to be clever. false
In the standard view, given (7) and (8), the (a) alternatives are read as true and ambiguous, since
he can refer to John himself or someone other than John. On the contrary, it is false to report the
(b) alternatives as John’s hope or speech. It is not the case that John thought “I should be elected”
or “I am clever” in (7) and (8). Thus, PRO is not the candidate on TV nor the author of the paper.
Alternatives (b) would then be construed de se. De se requires the awareness of an attitude holder
for something to be attributed to him. The difference, therefore, between the alternatives in (a) and
those in (b) is the awareness of John in both scenarios.
As stated earlier, logophoric pronouns seem to share distributional properties with PRO in the
sense that they can only occur in an embedded clause and when they do, they obligatorily refer to
some designated argument of the embedding verb (see Chierchia 1989; Schlenker 1999, etc). Also,
as suggested by Reinhart (1990), signalling a de se reading is one of the functions of logophoric
pronouns in a discourse. In effect, we may conclude that logophoric pronouns are unambiguosly
de se although it remains an empirical question. In Ewe, logophoricity has been investigated by
Clements (1975) and Agbedor (2014), among others. The interpretation of the Ewe logophor was
not discussed until Pearson (2015).
In the “competing view”, Pearson (2015) proposes ye` to have a de re construal in ‘pure’ Ewe
and Mina (dialect of Ewe spoken in Togo) see (9), a translation of (8) above. According to her, ye`
is a pronoun that picks out the bearer of the attitude (attitude holder) reported by the sentence in
which it occurs but does not require that the attitude holder thinks of himself or herself in a first
person way, hence, the use of ye` in (9) with respect to the context in (8). I will return to ‘mistaken’
identity in (4.2).
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(9) John
John
gblO
said
be
COMP
ye`
LOG
nya´
know
agbale˜.
book
‘Johni said hei is clever.’
3.2 Dream Reports
It is not possible for an individual to inhabit two different worlds at a given time. Thus, we are
usually in the third person, when we dream of being another individual. Percus and Sauerland
(2003) differentiate between the two identities we have in dreams namely, the ‘dream self’ (the
individual we are in our dreams) and the ‘dream subject’ (the individual who does the dreaming).
In (10), John is the ‘dream subject’ and Bill, the ‘dream self’.
(10) John dreamt that he was Bill and he got married to his granddaughter.
As discussed by Percus and Sauerland (2003), one might expect dream-sentences with more
than one pronoun, like (10), to allow readings on which any pronoun can correlate with either
the ‘dream self’ or the ‘dream subject’. However, this is not the case. Percus and Sauerland
(2003) propose the Oneiric Reference Constraint, from here on, ORC, to, as it were, guide the
interpretation of such dream sentences. The ORC says:
“A sentence of the form X dreamed that ...pronoun... allows a reading in which the
pronoun has the dream-self as its correlate only when the following condition is met:
some pronoun whose correlate is the dream-self on the reading in question must not
be asymmetrically c-commanded by any pronoun whose correlate is X” (Percus and
Sauerland 2003, p. 5).
In other words, a pronoun which picks out the dream self (de se) cannot be c-commanded by
another pronoun that merely refers (de re) to the dreamer. ORC, therefore, disallows a reading in
which the ‘dream self’, Bill, is the correlate of his and the ‘dream subject’, John, the correlate of
he, given that he c-commands his. Pearson (2015) suggests that dream reports serve as productive
grounds for testing the claims under discussion due to the possibility of a shift in reference. Ac-
cording to her, in dream reports, a de se pronoun should be able to select the ‘dream self’ whereas,
a de re one should be able to select the ‘dream subject’. In the previous example (10), we can
assume the following readings:
In John’s dream...
i. Billdese was marrying Bill’sdese granddaughter.
ii. Billdese was marrying John’sdere granddaughter.
iii. # Johndere was marrying Bill’sdese granddaughter.
iv. Johndere was marrying John’sdere granddaughter.
Given this pattern for English, we would expect Ewe to behave in a similar manner in (11)
and (12). This means that ye` should pick out Bill (dream self) and e´ should pick out John (dream
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subject). On the contrary, ye` picks out both the ‘dream subject’ and the ‘dream self’, similar
to option (ii) in the English paradigm, a rather surprising observation. This observation poses
questions to the widely-held view about logophorics: whether it is correct to pair up the notions of
logophorics and de se on one hand, and pair up the concept of ‘dream self’, ‘dream subject’ with
that of de re and de se on the other hand. I will maintain the view that the notion of logophoricity
and de se are closely related. The consequence will be that the theory of interpreting dreams may
not be useful for shedding light on the de re, de se distinction afterall7, given the behaviour of ye` in
(11) and (12). (11) and (12) simply show that in dreams everything is possible, the ‘dream subject’
can take the perspective of the ‘dream self’ because he perceives this person.
(11) John
John
ku´drO˜
dream
be
COMP
ye`
LOG
nye
COP
Bill
Bill
eye
CONJ
ye`
LOG
ãe
married
ye`-êe
LOG-POSS
tOgbuiyOvi.
granddaughter
‘John dreamt that he was Bill and he married his granddaughter.’
(12) John dreamt that he was Barack Obama and he gave himself a gift.
a. John
John
ku´drO˜
dream
be
COMP
ye`
LOG
nye
COP
Barack
Barack
Obama
Obama
eye
CONJ
ye`
LOG
na
gave
ye`
LOG
ãokui
REFL
nu-nana
thing-give.REDU
aãe.
INDEF
‘John dreamt that he was Barack Obama and he gave himself a gift.’
4 Interpretation of ye`: default de se
In light of contrasting views in the literature on ‘mistaken’ identity scenarios and dream reports,
this section contributes to the discussion on the interpretation of ye`.
4.1 Data Collection
In order to test the interpretation of ye`, I set up a small elicitation production task. Ten infor-
mants 8(native speakers of Ewedomegbe) evaluated the naturalness of sentences over Skype and
WhatsApp video, coupled with introspection (native speaker intuition). The voice note feature on
WhatsApp was also used to elicit data. Two informants come from Peki, one from Ho central, five
from Hlefi and the other two come from suburbs of Ho namely, Sokode Gbogame and Abutia-Teti.
The first part of the task was to expose them to structures that did not involve ‘mistaken’ identity.
For instance, Mawuse and Akpene are chatting. Mawuse says to Akpene ”I am hungry”. What did
Mawuse say? Mawuse gblO be. . .
Then I provided scenarios from both “standard”, “competing” views and discovered scenarios
(e.g. (6), (8), (14), etc) and asked my informants to report them in indirect discourse. To guide
them, I would ask questions about what the attitude holder said, believed, thought, etc, depending
7Ede Zimmermann and Rajesh Bhatt also thought this to be the case.
8My informants are multilinguals of Ewedomegbe (Ewe), English and Akan (Asanti twi dialect of Akan). They
presently live in Ghana and have had some basic formal training in Ewe (they speak Ewedomegbe, read and write
Ewe).
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on the type of attitude predicate used. They were given a blank space to fill in the gaps with the
appropriate pronoun. For instance, John be . . . nya´ agbale/nu´. In order not to misconstrue the
domain of ye`, I required that they substitute the phrases involving res e.g. John be wo´ a tsia ame
si le TV la dzi ‘the person on TV’, with the suitable pronoun since most of them produced such
sentences. Elicitation took a maximum of 30 minutes per session depending on availability and
cooperation of the research subjects. English and Ewedomegbe was used interchangeably during
elicitation.
4.2 Mistaken Identity Scenarios
As a native speaker, I find Pearson (2015)’s conclusion (ye` has a de re reading) rather untenable. I
could think of a situation where a report can be made about what I have said about ‘someone, who
is actually me’, with ye`, but only as a manner of speaking, maybe for stylistic effects. Suppose I
cooked for a group of friends and as a way of complementing myself, I say “whoever prepared this
food is a good cook”, any of my friends could use (13) to represent my thoughts.
(13) Abby
Abby
be
say
ye`
LOG
nye
is
nu-ãa-la
thing-cook-one.who
nyui.
good
‘Abby said she is a good cook.’
Apart from a context like (13), it is simply impossible to refer to one’s res with ye`. I would
not use ye` in a ‘mistaken’ identity context. My research subjects were overwhelmed by the infor-
mational complexity of the ‘mistaken’ identity scenarios (e.g. Kaplan’s pants on fire). I therefore,
took a detour from such scenarios and presented real-world examples9, which seemed to make the
task easier. My research subjects could relate to these examples better.
(14) An Asian woman was declared missing from a party touring the Eldgja´ volcanic region in
south Iceland after getting off the party’s bus to freshen up. She only hopped off the bus
briefly, but had also changed her clothes - and her fellow travelers did not recognize her
when she climbed back on again to continue the party’s journey. When the details of the
missing person were issued, the woman reportedly didn’t recognize her own description
[woman with a pink sweater] and unwittingly joined the search party for herself, seeDaily
Mail for South Iceland Scenario10
In the South Iceland Scenario recapped as (15) and (16), (15) is supposed to report the state of
mind of the Asian woman at the time of the search. “The Asian woman believes that she is lost”
means “The Asian woman believes that the woman in the pink sweater is lost”. The difference
between the readings is: in the de se reading the Asian woman knows that she is the woman with
the pink sweater and in the de re reading she does not. My informants produced the following
sentences with respect to (14):
i. Asia nyOnu O xOese be ame aãe bu´ ‘The Asian woman believed someone was lost.’
9I am grateful to Amy Rose Deal for this idea.
10http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2195642/Asian-tourist-unwittingly-joins-search-HERSELF-failing-recognise-tour-groups-description-missingwoman.
html. Thanks to Amy Rose Deal for pointing out this example.
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ii. Asia nyOnu la bu´i be nyOnu aãe bu´ ‘The Asian woman thinks a woman is lost.’
Given the replacement task, they then preferred (15) to (16) to capture the belief of the Asian
woman although (16) is grammatical in the language.
(15) Asia
Asian
nyOnu
woman
la
DEF
xOese
believes
be
COMP
e´
3SG
bu´.
is lost
‘The Asian woman believes that she is lost.’
[e´ = the woman with the pink sweater]
(16) Asia
Asian
nyOnu
woman
la
DEF
xOese
believes
be
COMP
ye`
LOG
bu´.
is lost
# ‘The Asian woman believes of herself to be lost.’
[ye` 6= the woman with the pink sweater]
Pearson (2015)’s theory of interpreting logophoric pronouns predicts that the belief of the Asian
woman in the South Iceland Scenario may be expressed in Ewe by means of the logophoric pro-
noun ye`, having a genuine de re reading. However, based on (15), it is evident that logophoric ye`
may not be used in a de re reading in Ewedomegbe. It is impossible to interpret ye` as represent-
ing the individual that everybody is looking for in the South Iceland Scenario. The Asian woman
would never claim “I am lost” although she will learn at some point that she was missing. Another
natural scenario 11 worth pondering over is as follows:
(17) Fatu loves singing. The problem is that she sings very badly. When she sings, she dis-
turbs everybody around. Fatu, however is persuaded that she is a great singer, and that
she could have a great artistic career. Things become worse when Fatu gets it into her
head to bring out an album. In order to discourage her, her brother decided to record her
discreetly on his mobile phone as she was singing in the kitchen. He then sent her the
recording with the following question: “She sings well, doesn’t she?” Fatu listened to the
recording, and answered his brother: “That girl sounds horrible. She doesn’t sing well at
all”. Unfortunately, Fatu does not realize that it is her own voice that she has just heard.
(18) Fatu
Fatu
xOese
believe
be
COMP
ye`
LOG
me
NEG
dzı`
sing
na
HAB
ha
song
nyuie
good
o.
NEG
‘Fatu believes that she does not sing well.’ [ye` 6= the person with the bad voice]
We can observe that (18) is unacceptable given (17). In all worlds compatible with Fatu’s
believes, she is a great singer. She would never accept (18) as communicating her doxastic state.
4.3 Dream Reports
We have seen in section (3.2) above that ye` selects both the ‘dream subject’ and the ‘dream
self’. From the many discussions with my informants, I observed a difficulty to grasp the idea
of “counter-identity” in dreams. Do we really dream of being another? This could be a pschologi-
cal question and not a linguistic one. Subjects of attitudes may have counterparts to represent them
11Many thanks to Alassane Kiemtore´ of University of Stuttgart for sharing this scenario with me.
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in other worlds but they themselves are not there. My informants could relate to what is known
as “malaria-dreams”12 or better, being younger than they are in reality in their dreams. However,
the person they are in their dreams is still them. A possible explanation of ye` in dream reports
is that the use of ye` signals cognitive access to both the ‘dream self’ and ‘dream subject’ even if
they are different individuals; or that, ye` prefers a ‘strict’-identity (John is John and John is Bill
in all worlds). I tried to push the idea of “counter-identity” once more and (19) was the result.
Alternative (i), (ii) and (iv) seemed to be available.
(19) John
John
ku´drO˜
dream
be
COMP
ye`
LOG
nye
COP
Bill
Bill
eye
CONJ
ye`
LOG
abe
as
Bill
Bill
ãe
married
ye`-êe
LOG-POSS
tOgbuiyOvi.
granddaughter
‘John dreamt that he was Bill and as Bill he married his grand daughter.’
This means John’s mental state is of one that says the following: In John’s dream...
i. Billdese was marrying Bill’sdese granddaughter (“I dreamt that I was Bill and I, as Bill, married
my granddaughter”).
ii. Billdese was marrying John’sdere granddaughter (“I dreamt that I was Bill and I as Bill, married
my real self’s granddaughter”).
iii. # Johndere was marrying Bill’sdese granddaughter.
iv. Johndere was marrying John’sdere granddaughter (“I dreamt that I was Bill (but it doesnt matter
who I was in my dream), I, as my real self, married my real self’s granddaughter”).
With (19), it is possible that the presence of abe ‘as’ forces a de se reading since “as-phrases”
have a subject preference13. However, this is the best my informants could give me given the diffi-
culty at hand.
5 Explanations
This section attempts to offer some possible explanations to the differences in judgments with
respect to ‘mistaken’ identity scenarios.
5.1 Dialectal Variation: ‘Pure’ Ewe and Togo Ewe
The differences in judgments could be an effect of different dialects or registers. Note, however,
that all dialects of Ewe are mutually intelligible (Ameka 1991). I present the language situation in
Ewe and Togo.
‘Pure’ Ewe belongs to the Kwa branch of the Niger-Congo language family14. According to
12These are dreams people have after taking medication for malaria. It is usually in the form of nightmares (e.g.
one could dream of being dead, in coma or admitted to the hospital). Worse, one could hallucinate.
13Thanks to Idan Landau for pointing this out.
14It is odd to refer to the variety of Ewe spoken in Ghana as ‘pure’. However, I suspect Pearson’s informants used
the term to refer to the written standard variety of Ewe.
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M. P. Lewis, Simons, Fennig, et al. (2009), Ewe can further be classified as an Atlantic-Congo,
Volta-Congo, Left Bank, and Gbe language. It has been noted that the name Ewe applies to a
written standard (developed in the nineteenth century, with a high degree of coastal content) and
several spoken mutually intelligible dialects in the Volta region of Ghana and southern part of
Togo (Ameka 1991). Broadly, the dialects spoken in Ghana can be grouped geographically into:
Southern or coastal dialects and Northern or inland dialects, characterized indigenously as Ewe-
domegbe. The southern dialects are spoken in areas such as Anlo (ANlO), Tongu (TONu), Avenor,
Dzodze, etc. while the Northern dialects are spoken in areas such as Ho, Kpedze, Hohoe, Peki,
Kpando, Fodome, Danyi, Kpele, among others.
Togo, on the other hand, is a multilingual country. According to M. P. Lewis, Simons, Fennig,
et al. (2009), 44 languages are spoken in the country. Among the languages spoken, French is the
official language, while the interethnic languages used are French and ‘Mina’ (i.e. the dialect of
Ewe spoken in Lome, the capital of Togo). ‘Mina’ is also known as ‘Mina-Ewe’, ‘Ewe-Mina’,
‘Gengbe’ or simply ‘Gen’(Essizewa 2009; C. F. Voegelin and F. M. Voegelin 1964, p. 62).
Strikingly, Gen belongs to the Gbe dialect cluster15 of which Ewe also belongs (Essizewa
2009). It remains unclear why Pearson’s informants chose ye` in a ‘mistaken’ identity scenario if
for all dialects of Ewe, spoken in both Ghana and Togo, ye` is a logophoric pronoun used to report
the attitude or feelings of some person.
5.2 Methodology
The difference in judgment may also be a result of methods used to elicit data. I adopted elicitation
production, coupled with a truth value judgment task (selection and replacement task). The reason
was to allow informants to demonstrate their knowledge of the logophoric pronoun, by producing
sentences which required the use of this pronoun. The replacement task, particularly, allowed
for comparison between my responses and Pearson’s. On the other hand, Pearson (2015) used
grammaticality judgment as well as truth value judgment tasks. I suppose that the point of the
task is not to judge whether or not a sentence is ‘good’ or ‘bad’ in the language; otherwise, all the
sentences with ye` is grammatical in the language. This may have influenced Pearson’s responses.
5.3 Confused Informants
Differences in judgment could occur as a result of confusion on the part of Pearson’s informants
which was also the case for my informants. It was observed that the ‘mistaken’ identity scenarios
were notoriously difficult to understand and it was difficult to explain the point of the judgment
task to the informants. In such scenarios, the attitude holders are often temporarily disoriented
and informants found it hard in deciding from what time to report their attitude; the time when
the attitude holders don’t know who they are from the time they gained information about their
identity.
The first three of my informants reported ye` as possible in ‘mistaken’ identity reports as well,
but it turned out that they didn’t realise a difference between the point of view of the attitude
holder and point of view of the reporter. My informants (the first three) judged the sentences on
15https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/0/03/Gbe languages.png
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the grounds that they knew the attitude holders meant to talk about themselves. They certainly
misunderstood the point of the test and they confirmed that they may have lacked comprehension.
One of them actually said to me “enya kpakpa makOmakO fomeviwo ka ye´ ne tsO va na mı´?” ‘what
kinds of confusing stories have you brought to us?’ I had to explain the distinction between the
attitude holder as res meaning, he’s not aware that he is himself, and the attitude holder as himself
several times for most of my data collection session.
Given that Pearson used grammaticality and truth judgment tasks, I am tempted to also attribute
misrepresented sentences of (20), a real-life scenario, to be evaluated by informants. To see this,
compare (20-a) with (20-b).
(20) Following a spate of burglaries, a policeman was alerted by CCTV operators that someone
was acting suspiciously, and chased after that individual, unaware that it was himself16.
a. Sodza
Policeman
xOse
believe
be
COMPL
ye`
LOG
nyi
COP
fianfitO.
thief
‘The policemani believed that hei was a thief’ (Pearson 2015, p. 99).
b. KpovitO
Policeman
la
DEF
xOese
believe
be
COMP
ye`
LOG
le
is
amesi
person
wo`
3SG
bu`
think
fı`fı`
thiefing
le
of
Nuti
him
la
DEF
dı´-m.
search-PROG
‘The policeman believed that he was looking for a suspect’ [From my informant].
c. KpovitO
policeman
la
DEF
xOese
believe
be
COMP
e´
3SG
nye
COP
fiafitO.
thief
‘The policeman believed that he was a thief.’
[e´ = the individual being chased by the policeman]
From (20-a) and (20-b) one can observe that the choice of words differ. Note, that one of
Pearson’s consultants (consultant 3) consistently rejects sentence (20-a). The policeman believed
he was looking for a suspect and not a thief. Trivial as this may seem, I think the res i.e the
individual being chased is that of the CCTV operator (see footnote for full scenario) and not even the
policeman. The judgments could have been sharper. Now, suppose it is the case that the policeman
was looking for a thief, my infromants would rather produce (20-c) as a suitable construction with
respect to the scenario.
5.4 Verbs Used
Interpretation of the logophoric pronoun may depend on the kind(s) of verb. For instance, Chier-
chia (1989, p. 17) suggests that a verb like persuade in (21) has an unambiguos de se reading.
Whereas, verbs of causation such as, force, make, etc in (22) unambiguosly have a de re reading.
(21) a. John persuaded Mary to be fired.
b. John persuaded Mary to bring about a situation where she is fired.
16http://uk.news.yahoo.com/policeman-chased-himself-for-20-minutes-while-looking-for-suspect.html.
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(22) a. John forced Mary to leave.
b. John forced Mary to bring about a situation where she leaves.
Chierchia (1989) proposes that (21-a) asymetrically entails (21-b) while, (22-a) entails (22-b)
and (22-b) in turn entails (22-a). Mary controls the complement of persuade in (21-a). She is
persuaded to bring about a situation where she and nobody else is fired, involving an indirect
attribution of the property of being fired to Mary. The same cannot be said for the use of force in
(22). ye` does not show up an equivalent Ewe example (23). Instead we use a connecting pronoun
ne´, this needs further investigation.
(23) John
John
te´-ãe
push-unto
Mary
Mary
dzı´
prep
be
COMP
ne´
pronoun
dzo´.
leave
‘John forced Mary to leave.’
Pearson (2015) investigates verbs like say, think and believe. Some of those verbs are known
as control verbs and some as exceptional case marking verbs. For ‘mistaken’ identity scenarios, I
found the same judgments for the verbs gblO ‘say’, xOese ‘believe’, mOkpOkpO ‘hope’ and bu`/su´su´
‘think’ in Ewedomegbe.
(24) a. John
John
gblO
say
be
COMP
e´
3SG
nya´
know
agbale˜.
book
‘Johni said that hej is clever.’
b. John
John
xOese
believed
be
COMP
e´
3SG
nya´
know
agbale˜.
book
‘Johni believed that hej is clever.’
c. John
John
bu`
thought
be
COMP
e´
3SG
nya´
know
agbale˜.
book
‘Johni thought that hej is clever.’
d. John
John
nO
be
mOkpOkpO
hope
me
in
be
COMP
e´
3SG
nya´
know
agbale˜.
book
‘Johni hoped that hej is clever.’
My informants would not use ye` regarding these verbs to communicate John’s feelings, if he
was unaware that he was the subject of the attitude. They always preferred e´ to ye`.
6 Conclusion
I conclude that ye` is a regular logophoric pronoun in Ewedomegbe, just like other logophoric
pronouns in other languages. As discussed, an attitude report involving ye` cannot be used to de-
scribe a situation where the attitude holder is unaware of his or her immediate condition. Thus, the
awareness of the attitude holder is a prominent condition in determining the interpretation of the
logophoric pronoun. Future research would have to show whether there are indeed dialectal dif-
13
ferences with respect to the interpretation of logophors. Also, future research would have to work
with examples like the South Iceland scenario. It would be interesting to investigate the kinds of
‘mistaken’ identity scenarios that allow a de se reading. Although Pearson (2015) involved five
informants and I, ten, involving more participants will be great for future work. Concerning dream
reports, I propose that dream reports may not be good grounds for shedding light on the de re, de
se distinction. The use of the notions de re and de se in dream reports seems to be different from
the use of de re and de se in attitude reports. Ewe shows this. It is not possible to say that the
dream subject is always de re.
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